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This paper considers the effects of state ownership and institutional inﬂuences on value creation through 
cross-border mergers & acquisitions by Chinese ﬁrms during the period using a sample of 468 ﬁrms. The 
ﬁndings indicate that Chinese bidders experience wealth gains ranging from 0.4771% to 1.5210% over a 
10-day event window. The cross-sectional analysis indicates that state ownership, formal institutional 
distance, reforms in the foreign currency approval system exert signiﬁcant impact on shareholder value. By 
considering the state ownership and institutions, this study provides evidence that government and 
institutions  play  a  huge  role  in  value  creation  of  emerging  market  ﬁrm  internationalisation  through 
cross-border mergers & acquisitions (CBM&A). 
 
1.  Introduction 
The recent empirical literature has paid notable attention to the role   of   governments   on   emerging   
market   ﬁrms’   decisions   to expand internationally through M&A (see Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010; 
Peng,  2010;  Rui  &  Yip,  2008;  Xiao  &  Sun,  2005).  These  studies indicate that emerging market 
institutions and governments play an important role in outward M&A decisions by ﬁrms in emerging 
markets.  However,  studies  that  examine  the  effects  of  state  and institutional  factors  on  the  
value  of  outward  M&A  by  emerging market ﬁrms are fairly scant. Prior studies have focused 
mostly on the  effects  of  economic  factors  in  acquiring  ﬁrm  value  and  have produced  mixed  
results  (see  Calomiris,  Fisman,  &  Wang,  2010; Chen,  Goldstein,  &  Jiang,  2007;  Datta  &  
Puia,  1995;  Gregory  & McCorriston, 2005; Markides & Itnner, 1994). This paper extends the prior 
literature by examining the effects of state ownership and institutional  factors  on  ﬁrm  value.  The  
main  objectives  of  this paper   are   twofold:   (i)   to   investigate   whether   government involvement   
through   state-owned   enterprises   (SOEs)   creates value  for  Chinese  acquiring  ﬁrms;  (ii)  to  
examine  the  impact  of institutions on the shareholder value of Chinese acquiring ﬁrms. 
We draw on the institutional perspective to address the above objectives for a number of reasons. 
First, institutions deﬁned as‘‘the  rules  of  the  game’’  have  a  signiﬁcant  impact on emerging 
market   ﬁrms’   behaviour   because   government   and   societal inﬂuences are stronger in emerging 
market economies compared to  developed  countries  (Hoskisson,  Eden,  Lau,  &  Wright,  2000). 
Institutions   help   shape   ﬁrm   structures   and   inﬂuence   ﬁrms’ strategic  choices  and  
competitiveness  (Fligstein,  1996;  North, 
1990). The role played  by home country institutions in shaping international expansion behaviour 
has implications for ﬁrm value because  institutions  affect  the  cost  of  doing  business,  have  an 
impact on ﬁrms’ conﬁdence and create winners and losers in the marketplace   (Boddewyn   &   
Brewer,   1994;   Kofele-Kale,   1992; Leone, 1986). Good institutions facilitate effective functioning 
of market mechanisms, enabling ﬁrms and individuals ‘‘to engage in market  transaction(s)  without  
incurring  undue  costs  or  risks’’ (Meyer,  Estrin,  Bhaumik,  &  Peng,  2009:  63),  and  increase  
ﬁrm value  (Shleifer  &  Vishny,  1994).  However,  ‘‘bad’’  institutions increase  the  cost  of  doing  
business  (Ang  &  Michailova,  2008). Second, state ownership unavoidably brings political 
objectives into  corporate  decision  making,  which  can  damage  corporate value (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1994). Conversely, it is argued that state ownership of ﬁrms in emerging markets can lead to 
preferential treatment  from  the  government  and  favourable  allocation  of resources,  thereby  
enhancing  the  value  of  a  ﬁrm  (Sun  &  Tong, 
2003; Tian & Estrin, 2008). 
In  this  paper,  we  examine  the  effects  of  state  ownership  and institutional  variables  on  ﬁrm  
value  using  acquirers’  returns  (a direct   measure   of   shareholder   value   and   investors’   future 
expectations), which is consistent with the strategic goal of wealth maximisation of a ﬁrm (McGee, 
Thomas, & Wilson, 2008). 
The focus on Chinese CBM&A during the 1998–2011 period as an empirical context for the study is 
motivated by the following: (i) China is  the largest  emerging economy  and  CBM&A are  growing 
exponentially  and  constitute  a  predominant  entry  strategy  of foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
Chinese ﬁrms (UNCTAD, 2012). The value of CBM&A purchases by Chinese ﬁrms, which stood at 
only US$185 million in 1991, reached a value of US$37,111 million in  2012  (UNCTAD,  2013).  
China  accounted  for  approximately 
66.49% of CBM&A purchases from Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) countries plus South 
Africa in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013). Like other  emerging  economies,  the  surge  in  CBM&A  
activities  by Chinese ﬁrms is attributed to a number of reforms and changes in the environment in 
which CBM&A operate. The reforms include the establishment  of  (i)  two  stock  exchanges,  
namely,  Shanghai  and Shenzhen  Stock  Exchanges  in  1989  and  1991,  respectively;  (ii) 
simpliﬁcation  and  decentralisation  of  foreign  exchange  adminis- tration  and  the  establishment  
of  a  foreign  exchange  market  to facilitate trading of the Chinese Renminbi with several currencies; 
(iii)  changes  in  government  policies  towards  outward  foreign direct investment (OFDI) and 
enterprise reforms. In particular, the ‘‘go abroad  strategy’’  initiated  by  the  Chinese  government  
to provide ﬁnancial and other support mechanisms, reduce institutional   constraints   and   help   
Chinese   ﬁrms   to   become   global champions has been a tremendous push behind the rise in 
CBM&A activities. These key reforms embarked upon by the government together with  the  ‘go  
abroad’  strategy  initiated  in  1999  have largely  contributed  to  the  growth  of  cross-border  
mergers  & acquisition   activities.   However, despite   these   reforms,   state- owned  and  state-
controlled  ﬁrms  remain  the  dominant  force  in CBM&A activities (Chen & Young, 2010). The 
involvement of SOEs in CBM&A allows us to capture their effects on ﬁrm value. 
This paper makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, it  contributes  to  institutional  
theory  and  its  application  in international   business   and   ﬁnance   research,   particularly   with 
respect  to  value  creation  in  CBM&A  by  emerging  market  ﬁrms. Thus, the paper sheds light on 
emerging market ﬁrm responses to institutional   pressures.   Second,  this study   contributes   to   the 
empirical   research   on   cross-border   investment   by   emerging market  ﬁrms,  with  speciﬁc  
reference  to  China,  which  has  seen massive  reforms  unparalleled  by  any  other  emerging  
economy over the last two decades. Given the uniqueness of Chinese reforms and heavy  government  
involvement  in  CBM&A  to  help  ﬁrms acquire the resources that China lacks, we believe that the 
results of this study could serve as a lesson for policymakers and senior managers in other emerging 
countries regarding policy directions in their quest to become inﬂuential players in the global market 
for corporate control. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides  a  brief  theoretical  
background  with  respect  to  CBM&A and  ﬁrm  value  and  the  role  of  institutions.  This  
background  is followed by the study’s hypotheses. We then discuss the data and research   
methodology   used   in   this   study.   The   results   and discussion  follow.  The  ﬁnal  section  
provides  a  conclusion  and implications of the study. 
2.  Theoretical background 
2.1.  CBM&A and ﬁrm value 
Several theories explain the possible sources of gains following international   mergers   and   
acquisitions.   Four   of   the   common theories  identiﬁed  in  the  emerging  market  literature  
concern market   development   and   power,   the   resource   based   view, internalisation and 
diversiﬁcation. First, CBM&A activities provide emerging  market  ﬁrms  with  the  fastest  means  
to  access  new markets,  expand  their  product  and  consumer  markets  interna- tionally, overcome 
trade barriers and increase ﬁrm value (Boateng, Wang, & Yang, 2008; Deng, 2009). Boateng et al. 
(2008) found that market share and power are one of the highest ranked motives for CBM&A by 
Chinese ﬁrms and noted that market power is a source of value for acquiring ﬁrms. 
Second,  the  resource-based  view  literature  suggests  that  one important reason for CBM&A is to 
gain access to strategic assets, such  as  natural  resources,  product  differentiation,  patent-pro- tected 
technologies, and superior managerial and marketing skills. Acquisition of these capabilities and 
resources promotes techno- logical learning, facilitates the development of skills and compe- tencies, 
improves economies of scale and consequently increases ﬁrm  value  (Barney,  1991;  Vermeulen  &  
Barkema,  2001).  In  the context  of  China,  Deng  (2009),  Rui  and  Yip  (2008),  and  Boateng et  
al.  (2008)  reported  that  emerging  market  ﬁrms  as  latecomers lack resources and they strategically 
use CBM&A to achieve speciﬁc goals,   such   as   acquiring   strategic   capabilities   to   offset   their 
competitive weaknesses and increase ﬁrm value. 
Third,   the   internalisation   framework   is   premised   on   the contention that ﬁrms extract above-
normal returns from CBM&A investment by internalising host country imperfections when their 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc   assets   cannot   ﬁnd   comparable   value   elsewhere (Buckley  &  Casson,  1976;  
Caves,  1971;  Morck  &  Yeung,  1991; Morck & Yeung, 1992). Researchers argue that the economic 
rents derived from internalisation can be converted into a higher value for  emerging  market  ﬁrms  
(Aybar  &  Ficici,  2009;  Boateng  et  al., 
2008; Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010). 
Fourth, CBM&A allow ﬁrms an opportunity to reduce costs and risks when entering new foreign 
markets (Seth, 1990). Diversiﬁ- cation as a source of value comes from exchange rate differences 
and the ability to lower the cost of debt and reduce variance in the cash  ﬂows  if  the  cash  ﬂows  of  
acquirers  and  targets  are  less correlated (Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2011; Morck & Yeung, 1992). 
2.2.  Institutional theory and CBM&A 
Over  the  past  decade,  institutional  theory  has  emerged  as  an important way to explain the 
behaviour of ﬁrms in emerging markets (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Child & 
Rodrigues, 
2005; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). The theory suggests that  institutional  contexts  (i.e.,  
the  combination  of  formal  rules, informal  constraints  and  their  enforcement  characteristics)  
create the  impetus  for  action  patterns  in  an  organisation.  Scott  (1995) identiﬁes three pillars of 
the institutional framework: the regulatory (existing   laws   and   rules),   the   cognitive   (widely   
shared   social knowledge and social perceptions that are taken for granted), and the  normative  
(social norms, values, and  culture).  Together, these pillars constitute a broad base from which a 
country’s institutional proﬁle may be analysed. As applied to research in management, the 
institution-based view posits that ﬁrms are shaped by the home and host countries’ institutional 
environments. Firms require legitimacy in  addition  to  economic  efﬁciency  to  survive  and  succeed  
(Scott, 
1995) and make strategic choices based on their interactions with institutions  (Peng,  2002).  It  is  
therefore  argued  that  ﬁrms  must consider wider inﬂuences than ﬁrm- and industry-level factors 
when crafting  and  implementing  strategies  to  gain  competitive  advan- tages, such as support 
from the state and society. 
In   the   case   of   China,   state-sponsored   and   state-supported acquisitions   have   become   the   
normal   mode   through   which Chinese  enterprises  enter  and  penetrate  a  host  country  (Child  
& Rodrigues,   2005).   When   conducting   CBM&A   activities,   ﬁrms engage  with  institutional  
processes  in  both  the  home  and  host countries (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
In the home   country,   ﬁrms   are   subject   to   the   home   government’s regulatory  restrictions  
on  outward investments,  especially  when the home country is an emerging economy, where capital 
control is common (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). Firms’ CBM&A  decisions  
in  China  are  inﬂuenced  by  different  levels  of government, either through FDI incentives and 
support schemes or through government-administered approval systems. The approv- al system 
usually entails costs that can affect the value of a ﬁrm. Similarly, host country institutions may also 
affect a ﬁrm’s value. Good  host  country  institutions  imply  strong  legal  enforceability, which 
protects the interest of acquiring parties and reduces costs resulting   from   asymmetric   information.   
The   quality   of   these institutions   may   also   speed   up   the   process   of   mergers   and 
acquisitions, which may prevent deals from becoming hostile and thereby destroying a ﬁrm value. 
The literature also highlights the effects of state ownership on ﬁrm value. The effects of state 
ownership are subject to two interpreta- tions.  One  view  suggests  that  state  ownership  damages  
corporate value  because  government  intervention  will  slow  down  a  ﬁrm’s decision-making 
processes in an increasingly competitive  environ- ment. The contrary view argues that SOEs are 
more likely to receive preferential treatment from the government, thereby enhancing their value   
(Blanchard   &   Shleifer,   2001).   China,   like   other   emerging economies,  is  characterised  by  
active  government  involvement  in business through ownership and regulation (Child & Rodrigues, 
2005; Scott,  2002).  It  is  well  documented  that  Chinese  ﬁrms  involved  in CBM&A  have  
beneﬁted  from  government  support  through  value- added tax breaks and favourable ﬁnancing 
(UNCTAD, 2005; Xiao & Sun, 2005). The literature examining whether state ownership has had 
beneﬁcial or detrimental effect on Chinese ﬁrm value has been mixed (see Sun, Tong, & Tong, 2002; 
Wei, Xie, & Zhang, 2005). We examine whether   the   institutions   in   China’s   emerging   market   
economy enhance or destroy value in Chinese CBM&A. 
In light of the above discussion, we propose a framework (Fig. 1) to analyse the effects of state 
ownership and institutional variables on the returns of Chinese acquiring companies. 
3.  Hypothesis development 
3.1.  State ownership 
A    number    of    studies    (e.g.,    Boycko,    Shleifer,    &    Vishny, 1996;   Dewenter  &  Malatesta,  
2001;   Megginson,  Nash,  &  van Randenborgh,  1994)  argue  that  SOEs  are  less  efﬁcient  
compared with  privately  owned  ﬁrms  because  SOEs  tend  to  be  politically rather   than   
commercially   motivated,   which   leads   to   poor operating  performance.  For  example,  to  reduce  
social  pressures, through its ownership of ﬁrms, government may pursue goals such as   reducing   
unemployment   rather   than   proﬁt   maximisation. Others  argue  that  state  ownership  heightens  
bureaucracy  and information asymmetry thereby destroying ﬁrm value (see Boycko et al., 1996; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). 
Bai,  Lu,  and  Tao  (2006),  Guariglia,  Liu,  and  Song  (2011)  and Poncet, Steingress, and 
Vandenbussche (2010) also argue that the pursuit  of  socio-economic  and  political  objectives  by  
emerging market governments might also induce soft budget constraints and provide some support 
for state-controlled ﬁrms. For example, Luo et al. (2010) and Peng, Wang, and Jiang (2008) have 
documented that  through  its  ownership  of  ﬁrms  the  Chinese  government provides  tax  rebates,  
foreign  exchange  assistance  and  ﬁnancial support   for   ﬁrms   engaged   in   outward   M&A.   
Moreover,   prior studies  have  also  documented  that  ﬁrms  with  state  ownership tend to face 
fewer ﬁnancial constraints when conducting outward investment  compared  to  privately  owned  
ﬁrms  (Lin  &  Bo,  2012; Zhou, Guo, Hua, & Doukas, 2012). Using a dataset of 20,000 Chinese 
ﬁrms, Poncet et al. (2010) and Guariglia et al. (2011) conclude that private   ﬁrms   in   China   face   
severe   ﬁnancial   constraints   on investments  while  SOEs  do  not.  It  is  expected  that  government 
support, through lower lending rates and other incentives for SOEs, may  provide  a  positive  signal  
to  stock  markets  about  the  future prospects of  ﬁrms engaged in outward acquisitions and increase 
acquirer  returns  (Lubatkin  &  Shrieves,  1986;  McGee,  Thomas,  & Wilson, 2008). We therefore 
argue that the political and economic advantages of preferential treatment given to SOEs are likely 
to be impounded  in  stock  prices  and  reﬂected  in  increased  acquirer returns if Chinese stock 
markets are efﬁcient. The argument leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis  1:  Acquiring  ﬁrms  that  are  partly  state-owned  will generate positive abnormal returns 
compared to non-state owned ﬁrms. 
3.2.  Formal institutional distance 
The quality of public institutions is used as a proxy for formal institutions.   Berry  (2006)  contends  
that  a  more  institutionally developed  market  is  likely  to  provide  a  location  with  less  risk 
where    knowledge    can    be    acquired    or    learned,    and    more institutional  protection  
provided  for  investments.  It  follows  that acquisitions by emerging economy ﬁrms in institutionally 
devel- oped  countries,  which  are  characterised  by  competitive  markets and  customer-centric  
focus,  are  likely  to  offer  a  rich  reservoir  of 
learning for Chinese ﬁrms that lack cutting-edge technology and other resources that can 
subsequently be internalised in different markets and at home. Chan, Isobe, and Makino (2008) note 
that the enhanced    learning    experience    offered    by    targets    in    more institutionally  developed  
environments  is  of  signiﬁcant  value  to emerging economy  ﬁrms. In  a  recent study in  India, 
Gubbi et al. (2010) found a positive relationship between institutional distance and value  creation  
of  Indian  acquirers.  No  study  has  explicitly examined  institutional  distance  in  China,  even  
though  former communist China has witnessed unprecedented reforms over the past  two  decades.  
An  examination  of  the  effects  of  institutional distance  on  ﬁrm  value  allows  us  to  capture  the  
regulative  and cognitive   constructs   of   China   and   host   economies.   Thus,   we hypothesise 
the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese acquirers engaged in CBM&A activities in a developed formal institutional 
environment will generate positive abnormal returns. 
3.3.  Foreign exchange reforms 
The  Chinese  authorities  have  changed  the  foreign  exchange regime to a ‘buy-to-use’ policy in 
place of the ‘earn-to-use’ policy of the  early  1990s  (Voss,  Buckley,  &  Cross,  2010).  In  2003,  
the government   implemented   changes   to   speed   up   the   foreign exchange  application  approval  
system  for  CBM&A  but  stopped short  of  completely  liberalising  the  system.  In  2006,  the  
central authorities further liberalised the regulatory process and  foreign exchange  control  by  
completely  decentralising  the  system  from the State Council to the provincial level and abolishing 
the US$5 billion local limit (Voss et al., 2010; Wu & Sia, 2002). It is important to note that foreign 
exchange reform is the only reform policy that has undergone a complete decentralisation from the 
State Council to the Provincial level regarding the approval of funds to undertake CBM&A. 
We  argue  that  liberalisation  of  the  foreign  exchange  regime reduces bureaucracy and the costs 
of doing business and facilitates international transactions among Chinese ﬁrms wishing to make 
international   acquisitions.   We   expect   that   the   reforms   will generate positive value effects 
when acquisitions are announced because of the potential reduction in the costs of doing business. It 
is   expected   that  the   ensuing   efﬁciencies   associated   with   the reforms   in   the   foreign   
exchange   system   should   convert   into positive  stock  price  movement  for  Chinese  acquirers  
and  that acquirers’ returns will be higher than returns before the reforms on the assumption that the 
stock markets in China are efﬁcient. We will therefore test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis  3:  Chinese  acquirers  engaged  in  CBM&A  will  create more  value  as  a  result  of  
the  reforms  in  the  foreign  exchange approval systems. 
3.4.  Informal institutional distance (culture) 
Prior   literature   shows   that   informal   institutions   have   a signiﬁcant  effect  on  the  value  of  
ﬁrms  engaged  in  CBM&A.  It  is argued  that  cultural  proximity  improves  ﬁrm  value  of  CBM&A 
because   the   acquirers’   and   targets’   diverse   sets   of   routines embedded  in  national  culture  
are  easily  accessible  (Hofstede, 
1980;  Morosini,  Shane,  &  Singh,  1998).  Moreover,  a  number  of researchers   suggest   that   
cultural   differences   between   home country and host country are negatively associated with the 
ﬁrm value of CBM&A and that such effects may be felt in both the pre- acquisition  phase  (Hofstede,  
1980;  Kogut  &  Singh,  1988;  Ahern, Dominelli,   &   Fracassi,   in   press)   and   post-acquisition   
phase (Geringer, Beamish, & daCosta, 1989). 
In   terms   of   the   pre-acquisition   cultural   effect,   signiﬁcant cultural  differences  may  be  a  
source  of  management  resistance from target ﬁrms, which can increase transaction costs 
(Cartwright 
& Cooper, 1993) and lower the value creation of acquiring ﬁrms. For  post-acquisition  effects,  
signiﬁcant  cultural  differences  in- crease  the  difﬁculty  of  assimilation  and  transferring  
distinctive competencies between acquirers and targets (Datta & Puia, 1995; Geringer et al., 1989). 
Thus, the larger the cultural difference the more  difﬁculty  acquiring  ﬁrms  may  have  in  gaining  
normative legitimacy   as   measured   by   informal   institutions   in   the   host country. For example, 
one of the main reasons for the failure of the acquisition of the TV business of Thomson in France 
by TCL of China was unfamiliarity with the European business operations. Accord- ing to Deng 
(2010): 520, ‘‘the new company did not work well with people  from  different  cultures,  with  
different  experiences,  and with different routines.’’ It is argued that the greater the cultural 
differences between two countries, the greater the value destruc- tion. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis addresses the effect of cultural proximity on acquirers’ returns: 
Hypothesis 4: High cultural distance between China and the host countries of target ﬁrms will have a 
negative effect on the returns of the Chinese acquirers. 
4.  Data and research methodology 
4.1.  Data source 
This study considers all completed CBM&A by publicly traded 
Chinese  ﬁrms  over  the  period  from  January  1998  to  December 
2011.  We  obtained  our  data  from   the  Chinese  Stock  Market Research   (CSMAR)   database.   
The   CSMAR   database   provides information  regarding  the  acquirer’s  name,  relevant  transaction 
dates,  target  name  and  country  of  origin,  deal  value,  deal  type, restructuring type, industry, and 
method of payment. CSMAR is a high-quality  Chinese  database  produced  by  a  Hong  Kong  
based company called GTA. The M&A data began in 1998 and are updated constantly. We compared 
the data from the CSMAR database with the Thomson SDC Platinum M&A database and the 
Datastream. The CSMAR  database  appears  to  provide  relatively  more  up-to-date information  in  
terms  of  the  number  of  acquisitions  and  stock returns  with  fewer  missing  values.  We  also  
cross-checked  the details relating to deal values, target country of origin and other relevant  details  
with  newspapers,  business  magazines,  and  the China M&A Yearbook. Share price data were also 
collected from the CSMAR  database,  which  provides  daily  share  prices  of  all  of  the public 
ﬁrms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
4.2.  Sample selection 
Our initial population consists of 1063 CBM&A bids by Chinese ﬁrms. For inclusion in the ﬁnal 
sample, the following restrictions were imposed on the acquiring ﬁrms: 
The acquirer must be listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges under A share, which 
provides data on CBM&A in China, and the company shares must be actively traded: 
 
(i)  Neither the acquirer nor the target should be a ﬁnancial ﬁrm. 
All  ﬁrms   that  belong  to  the   ﬁnancial  sectors,   banks,  life assurance companies, investment 
ﬁrms, insurance companies and   real   estate   investment   trusts   are   excluded   from   the sample. 
The reason behind this is that ﬁnancial ﬁrms have a different  nature  of  assets  and  liabilities,  
different  ﬁnancial reporting  systems  and  unique  regulations,  all  of  which  may inﬂuence ﬁrm 
value and bias results. 
(ii)  The  acquirer  must  not  be  involved  in  multiple  acquisitions within three months; the effects 
of each acquisition must be in this way properly separated. 
(iii)  There should not be a contaminating announcement within 30 business days before or after the 
announcement because other events  surrounding  an  acquisition  may  also  inﬂuence  stock prices, 
which may lead to biased results. 
(iv)  The acquirer must acquire more than 10% of the target because acquiring  a  stake  less  than  
10%  is  classiﬁed  as  a  portfolio investment rather than acquisition investment with manage- rial 
control under U.S. Department of Commerce guidelines. 
(v)  The   share   price   data   and   accounting   information   of   the acquirer must be available in 
the CSMAR database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
